Necessity of Linguistic Necessity
to the Theory of Translation

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Abstract:

The debate in American philosophy of language about naming and necessity (Kripke 1972, and Rosenberg 1994) can serve as a basis for a hermeneutic theory of translation. The Interpretive Frame (IF) suggested in the present paper, assumes that the scope of interpretation spreads from necessity to infinity. Linguistic necessity accounts for the relationship between language and reality, and thus gives an anchorage to the IF.

The language of translation, hypothesized as an interlanguage by Al-Shabab (1996), shows constant engagement with necessity and infinity via a process of approximation in which assertions are made to bring about relative stability which is essential for communication. Davidson's views on "assertion" are used to bring about the stability needed for the Interpretive Frame.

The paper argues that contributions from American linguistics and American philosophy of language benefit the current hermeneutic approach to translation.

1. Background

Simple observation and descriptive adequacy require that a theoretical model of translation takes account of "difference" in translational data (Al-Shabab 1997). A reductionist theoretical stance based on formal "equivalence" may gain in economy and generalization (Catford 1965), but it fails to address "difference" in translation. A modified version of equivalence advocating "semantic and pragmatic equivalence", begs the question of "equivalence" altogether (Baker 1991). Meanwhile, a strict sociolinguistic approach may address various aspects of variation in translation by a systematic process of approximation and refinement guided by socio-situational and linguistic factors such as "language variety", "linguistic features", and topic" (Hewson and Martin 1991).

In *Interpretation and the Language of Translation, Creativity and Convention in Translation* (1996), Al-Shabab adopts a hermeneutic stance attempting to incorporate "difference" in a theoretical frame that has descriptive adequacy and that endows translation theory with a good measure of explanatory power. But what are the implications of adopting an interpretive stance for linguistic theory and translation? What is the potential scope of interpretation and how is it practiced in reality? Firstly, adopting an interpretive approach has meant the postulation of a translation-specific level of linguistic analysis (Al-Shabab 1987), and developing that into the designation of "the language of translation" as an interlanguage, different from both Source Language (SL) and Target Language (TL). Meanwhile, the actual practice of translation is mapped on a continuum spreading from convention to creativity (Al-Shabab 1996). The linguistic realizations of creativity and convention are determined by the individual's translator tendency (choice of a position) and the language variety being translated.

So far the postulation of a "language of translation" and the dependency of this language on interpretation of the Source Text ST and on interpretation in a new language has not said much about the nature of linguistic interpretation, its scope and potential for translation theory and practice. The present paper investigates just one dimension of the scope of the interpretive act, which is seen as the behavioral output of the human translator who uses an interpretive frame to achieve (1) linguistic interpretation and (2) a re-writing in a new language (see Al-Shabab, forthcoming). The Interpretive Frame (IF), which I suggest below, has seven elements including "Experience and Knowledge" and "Assertion".

The present paper investigates two elements of the IF: the forth element "Experience and Knowledge" and the fifth element "Assertion". The investigation is limited to the question of linguistic necessity, represented in cases in which meaning is supposed to be necessarily retrieved or inferred. The choice of necessity is made because it constitutes the extreme end of conventionality and determinism in linguistic meaning, and thus should be quite simple to account for. The aim of this brief discussion is to explain the relevance of interpretive input to linguistic necessity, via demonstrating its epistemological implications, its truth conditions, and its embodiment in translation.

Figure (1) : the Elements of the IF, and their relation to the user.

2. Linguistic Necessity and Interpretation

On first look, linguistic necessity, which suggests an extreme case of linguistic determinism, seems to be irreconcilable, and even contrary to "interpretation". But a close examination of what is supposed to be "necessarily" meant reveals that at the heart of reconstructing meaning lies a process of interpretation realized in an interpretive act. In other words, when a given name refers to, and thus retrieves the meaning of its "referent", it does so by virtue of resorting to the user's experience and epistemic background.

The question of necessity in relation to naming shows that even from a philosophical perspective, communicative and idiolectic considerations are relevant. Linguistically, the determination of the scope of interpretation in language and translation stands to benefit from insights gained from the debate about the epistemology of necessity in the case of proper names.

First Kripke (1972) presents his case for naming and necessity. Kripke's main thesis states that "names", proper names, and only names, can designate their "referent". The Kripkean position presents two claims: (1) proper names are rigid designators, and (2) no description of a name can act as a rigid designator. Thus, "Aristotle" (in "Aristotle was fond of dogs") necessarily refers to "the last great philosopher of antiquity". While the description "the last great philosopher of antiquity" may successfully refer to the same individual, it fails to meet the "rigidity rule" (Kripke, 1972, pp. 6-7). The detailed argument provided by Kripke, amounts to an attempt to refute Frege's and Russell's positions on the status of descriptors. It, moreover, lends support to an essentialist, substantivist stance which endows proper names with special power. This, Kripke achieves by evoking the notions of necessity, rigid designation, identity, unique properties, and all possibilities (ibid. pp. 1-18). At one point, he uses the notion of "idiolect" to narrow down the scope of reference (p. 71). Ultimately, Kripke suggests six theses for naming and necessity, and a "condition" or methodological rule, which should apply to each of the six theses, otherwise they "cannot be satisfied" (Kripke 1972, p. 71).

The Kripkean line of thinking allows a name to necessarily refer even when the user of the name mistakenly uses the wrong name.

> **… by "Gödel" I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. … If that is what you do, then if Schmidt discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic you do refer to him when you say "Gödel did such and such.**
>
> **(Kripke 1972, p. 71)**

Descriptors do not (rigidly) designate the proper name "Gödel" according to Rosenberg (1994). Rosenberg provides a thourough critique of Kripke's position, by showing that in actual communication people use names and successfully refer, though sometimes mistakenly, to whoever they happen to have and/or be interested in. Most importantly, Rosenberg takes account of "idiolectic sense" and the state of knowledge of the language user as a speaker or listener. Moreover, reference "provides a viable frame for using names in actual communication. The frame suggested by Rosenberg takes account of intricate cases in possible worlds. It rests on six suggestions which reformulate "Kripke's own no-circularity condition" (Rosenberg 1994, p. 86).

Developing his frame to a discussion of idiolectic sense, Rosenberg provides the current discussion of interpretation with a viable epistemological base. He writes

> **I have introduced the notion of two speaker's confluent use of a given proper name to describe the situation in which their respective idiolectic senses for the name.**
>
> **(Rosenberg 1994, p. 116)**

This develops into a "default condition", a situation in which

> **Normally, that is, when two people use the same proper name in conversation, they enter into a tacit contract, so to speak, to exchange idiolectic senses. Less metaphorically, each speaker is initially prima facie authorized to add to his or her idiolectic sense for the name those claims made by the conversational partner in which that name occurs, and each speaker's idiolectic sense for the name thus dynamically alters and evolves as the conversation proceeds.**
>
> **(Rosenberg 1994, p. 113)**

"The job of the proper name thus becomes to "collect descriptive propositions" (ibid. p. 115). Among other things, Rosenberg sees himself as giving an account which "would do justice to the strengths and insights of both the classical Descriptivist picture of proper names and Kripke's own causal-historical picture while avoiding their failings and excesses". Thus he would have "what we might call the *epistemic picture* of proper names" (ibid. p. 124).

In addition, Rosenberg suggests that circularity is eliminated by using the "descriptive context" which is elucidated in "epistemic terms", and by using "the methods of inquiry constituting the empirical epistemics" (Rosenberg 1994, p. 129). Circularity according to him is

> **defused by noting that what makes an inquiry 'empirical' is not a matter of semantic (referential) relation between linguistic objects or entities in the world, but rather of relationships between specific epistemic conducts (e.g. adopting or abandoning explanatory claims, or theories) and the broader contexts of sensory perception and practical action.**
>
> **(Rosenberg 1994, p. 129)**

In the last two sentences of his book, Rosenberg admits that "logical calculi" have "their strengths" and "limitations", drawing on a Wittgensteinian metaphor. He writes "the comparatively tidy inferential lines of our conceptual "suburbs", for example mathematics and sciences, are unlikely to be echoed by similar orderlinesses, …, in the narrow and twisted streets of the "old town" … of our ancient and complex contentive conceptions of *ourselves* as knowers and doers in a world not of our making" (ibid. p. 198).

This last low-key sentence of the book points to the "gap" which the interpretive frame stands to fill in, be it only at the linguistic level. The terms "contentive" and "ourselves" need immediate attention and comment. The first, contentive, is needed in any experience system, any knowledge paradigm; the second, ourselves, brings back the question of knowledge, language, and the world of humans. But whether the "world" in which we communicate is "our making" or not is to be seen.

In the present context, Rosenberg's idiolectic epistemic approach serves the interpretive act in a number of ways. First, he rightly emphasizes the individual's communicative domain which agrees with taking interpretation as primarily an individual act. Secondly, he illustrates the complex network of relations a particular individual may resort to in order to retrieve the "referent" meaning of a given name. Thirdly, he brings forward the epistemic dimension of necessity, meaning and interpretation. Of course, an obvious problem for Rosenberg is seen in his use of constructed (complex) examples, which serve his purposes of modifying Kripke's position, but which are of little help for explaining actual interpretive acts in actual texts.

Rosenberg's borrowed metaphor about "our ancient and complex contentive conceptions of ourselves as knowers and doers in a world not of our making" can be understood in a number of ways. After providing a chapter on "logical calculi" in which he emphasizes the logic of the "orderliness" of the world of names, he produces a "reflective equilibrium among inferential intuitions" (ibid. p. 198). This compromise is better achieved by suggesting a state of relative stability, against which the language user's (temporal) "assertions" are studied.

Linguistically, descriptors used adjacent to a proper name are retrieved in actual discourse by audience membership of a contractual base between speaker/writer and reader/listener as the example from Al-Shabab and

Swales (1986) illustrates. Thus, only the first descriptor in the following pair is accepted by Arab radio news audience.

In the Syrian Capital Damascus …
In the Babylonian capital Damascus …

(Al-shabab and Swales, 1986, p. 38)

Al-Shabab (1987) elaborates on nominal and sentencial background information in radio news discourse, showing how news editors, for their own purposes, select certain descriptors rather than others to present the news worthiness of the name bearer. In translation, the utterance (descriptor) "the Syrian capital" constitutes an essential addition to the Translated Text, in order to achieve appropriate reference to "Damascus" for those listeners of the BBC World Service, to whom the proper name fails to designate the referent of the name. This utterance would, however, be absolutely unnecessary when the news is addressed to Syrian listeners, who need not be informed that Damascus is the capital of Syria. Thus, for communicative purposes, including interpreting and translating, the name may be complemented and/or reduced and changed by drawing on linguistic conventions and practicality, rather than canonical principles of rigidity or knowability. Linguistic knowledge and experience of the world enable conscious humans to retrieve a name bearer and to successfully construct - add and/or take from − their own meaning of what they read/hear or speak/write.

Ibn Rushd and Abu Al-Walid are commonly used as alternative names to refer to the same individual (Arab Philosopher). In Western medieval tradition the same individual was named in translation as "Averoes". Now for translation into English the most commensurably functional name is Averoes. If a translator insists on using the Arabic "Ibn Rushd" in his/her English translation, s/he takes the risk of not being understood. Meanwhile, the cultural reference to Arabic in this case is secured.

But linguistically, the question of necessarily referring to or communicating the meaning of a name is tied to the grammatical notion of definiteness and the semantic notion of "sameness" or "exactitude". In this category, "pronouns" are closely related to proper names, since the referent of "I" should apparently refer to the (human) speaker. The referents of "he, she, I, and we" are primarily to humans. But the establishing of the identity

of a pronoun referent opens a rich world of endless possibilities. Let us take an example from Tennyson's "Ulysses". Towards the end of the poem, Ulysses says:

>   ; and though
> **We are not now that strength which in the old days**
> **Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are:**
> **One equal temper of heroic hearts,**
> **Made weak by time and fate, But strong in will**
> **To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.**
>   **(Tennyson, The Norton Introduction; and …, p. 306)**

What is the referent of "we"? The first candidate is the fictional character, Ulysses. But the referent could also be, of course, the real "historical" person who lived and fought in Troy. Another strong candidate is the poet, Tennyson himself, and the people of his age, i.e. the Victorians who felt the strains of buttressing the British Empire in late nineteenth century. But, of course, the referent may shift to any contemporary, past or future reader, interpreter, of Tennyson's poem. Still, what about using "to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield" as a school motto? Well in this case, the pronoun "we" refers to all students and graduates of that school, and maybe their teachers as well.

The shift of reference from one referent to another as seen above is quite common in reading and quoting literary texts. But how would this shift affect the meaning of the text in translation? Surely, when Churchill quoted Milton's "though the field is lost all is not lost" with reference to the occupation of France in World War II, he did not speak for Satan, but for himself and the position of the alliance.
An illustrative intriguing example comes from Shakespeare's sonnet CXVI.

> **I never writ, nor no man ever loved.**
>   **(Shakespeare, The Norton Introduction, p. 21)**

What is the referent of "I" in the above line from the couplet? Who is the speaker/writer? Is it Shakespeare, or is it the reader/listener to the poem? Could "I" in this sonnet, in any possible world, refer to an "original" maker of the text other than Shakespeare? If this last reading is to be adopted, then one may start to obtain a novel reading of the poem as a whole. For example, "the marriage of true minds" in the first line of the sonnet can lend

support to such an interpretation. The sonnet says, if this (marriage of minds) is not true, i.e. if these two persons did not merge in the making and claiming of this poem, then I (the original writer) never writ (have not written) the sonnet which is attributed to William Shakespeare. Interpretation and translation involve more than just moving a text to another. An interpretative act, just like translation, is a field which thrives with appropriation. There is no interpretation without a degree of appropriation; and there is no translation without appropriation.

Thus, the two examples above show that whereas, canonical (logical) and epistemic (contentive) necessity is used as bases for interpretation, linguistic necessity starts from interpretation itself. Interpretation is part of linguistic necessity in the sense that what is linguistically necessary is so because it is based on an interpretation. The content of one's interpretation is part of the interpretation itself. The current argument can be developed further, because the Interpretive Frame processes interpretation by resorting to elements other than experience and assertion, and because the scope of interpretation starts from necessity, but has no limits on it except those of the language users. In fact, interpretation and translation are envisaged to operate on a continuum starting with necessity and extending to infinity. There are no limits on the networking of individual paradigm and how it embodies parts of the communal paradigm and the infinite linguistic potential.

3. Social Dimensions of Truth Conditions: from Reference to Statement

To carry on with the discussion of interpreting and translating of names and their descriptors, we need to handle cases as the following.

> **Averoes is the author of *fasl al-Maqaal (The Decisive Treatise).***

> **Wittgenstein is the author of *Tractatus Logicus philosophicus*.**

What would be the best analytical tools and basic assumptions for approaching an ordinary interpretation and later translation of such claims? Is the interpreter making an assertion every time s/he interprets or translates a statement? What is the truth-value status of such an interpretation or translation?

The present Interpretive Frame claims that an "assertion" no matter how implicit or tentative, is being made whenever language is read or translated.

The questions which we need to address here relate to the analytical model which can help us understand the interpreter/translator's position. In the following paragraphs I will present a sketch of the relevance of Davidson's position on the truth of statements to provide the instrumental (methodological) explanation of the bases of everyday interpretation and all forms of translation. As for the "logic" or "power" of the interpreter/translator's assertion, these are seen here as a series of moves which end with a "compromised" position on the part of the interpreter or translator. To explain the status of such compromises, I use the term "relative stability", since this compromise may be adopted and proved to have explanatory power over a long period of time.

Western analytical philosophy has covered much ground on the way of building stable truth-value systems to analyze statements such as the two above, without being accused of self-assertion, tautology, or circularity. I am not after propagating positivist dogma or universal truth here. But simply, the interpretive model, currently suggested under the Interpretive Frame, needs an apparatus through which statements are interpreted and translated. In my essay on the language of translation, I did not elaborate on the stages of "interpretation of the ST, and interpretation in a new language" (Al-Shabab 1996, pp. 37-42). To understand the true dimensions of the interpreter/translator who achieves the jump within the complex network of language(s), a viable position on statements is needed. Davidson's position which takes into account the social dimension of the components of a given statement will be used. In addition, for analyzing interpretation and translation, the socio-cultural dimensions of the interpreter and translator have to be taken into account. The interpreter/translator, though working from an ex-cathedra hermeneutic position propped up by his/her being and an experiencing human identity, must operate within a frame which takes account of real-time and real-place consciousness, allowing for socio-cultural dimensions and temporal states of "belief" to foster "relative stability", a relativity which is found in language, knowledge, and all human achievements. It is not my intention to uphold a "relativist" reading of Davidson's contribution (cf. Rorty 1998) or to refute it. Rather, I am just using Davidson's position to explain the interpreter/translator's dilemma in handling vast possibilities in reading and translating. The Davidsonian position can be wedged between the Cartesian and the representational view, allowing for environmental and socio-cultural input which sheds light

on the ability of the human and no one else to interpret language and translate it (see Al-Shabab forthcoming for elaboration on this point).

4. Interpretation, Relative Stability, and Translatability

Few examples can illustrate the amount of complexity handled by the translator and the frailty of his/her creation. The translator's interpretation of the ST gives the translation critique a unique chance to see interpretation in progress. Translational data are invaluable in this respect. In this section only two elements, experience and background knowledge and assertion, of the interpretive Frame (IF) are considered. Let's start with a translation of the first and last lines of the Shakespearean sonnet quoted above, in order to follow the referent of the "I" and thus discover whether the translator's interpretation found in his translation sheds light on the speaker/writer identity.

> **Let me not to the marriage of true minds**
> **Admit impediments, …**
> **…**
> **I never writ, nor no man ever loved.**
> **(Shakespeare, The Norton Introduction … p. 21)**

Arabic translation:

<div dir="rtl">

لا تجعلني أضع حواجز بين القلبين المؤتلفين
</div>

[Don't make me put impediments, between two united hearts]

….

<div dir="rtl">

ما كنت كنت كتبت حروفاً قط ، ولم يحبب قبلي إنسان
</div>

[[I] have not written letters at all, and no man has loved before me]
(Translated by Sameer Al-Naser)

The answer to the question of the poet's identity is clear. The "I" in the ST is referring to Shakespeare and no hint to a possible writer/poet other than Shakespeare. The translator's voice as an interpreter is clear in the first line, where "minds" is rendered into "hearts". This is of course supported in the body of the ST by elaboration on the main topic of "love" in the second line and after: "Love is not love/ which alters when it alteration finds, …". This is the translator's topic and the line of development of the translated poem.

Turning to another example from Auden's "Muséee des Beaux Arts", let us take the first two lines.

> **About suffering they were never wrong,**
> **The Old Masters: …**
> > **(Auden, The Norton Introduction…, p. 92)**

Arabic translation:

> **'an l'aalaam lam yagfal,**
> **About suffering never passed over**

> **'uzamaa'u lfan: …**
> **[great artists]**
> > **(Translated by Sameer Al-Naser)**

The referent of "Old Masters" presents a challenge to the reader of the ST in English. Though Auden's description focuses on one painting in the museum by Brueghel, still the reference is not to Brueghel alone, but to great artists. Still from the history of art in European context, it is known that "Old Masters" is a general reference to Renaissance artists in Europe, a term which can extend to their followers. However, there is no strict criterion to help us decide who among European artists is definitely included or excluded on the margins of this category.

The translator left the reference open to any "great artist" anywhere at any time. This is due to the wider scope of Arabic culture which would not necessarily evoke European art or history of art in Arabic context. For a while, I would like to turn to the translator's "assertion" implicit in the translation of this statement. The Arabic translation can be paraphrased in the following,

> **Great artists have concerned themselves with suffering**

which captures one possible interpretation of the ST statement. But the statement in the ST, in English, can also mean the following:

> **a. The Old Masters are right about suffering.**
> **b. The Old Masters explicate the nature of human suffering.**
> **c. The Old Masters have fathomed the depth of human suffering.**
> **d. The Old masters know best when it comes to human suffering.**

In other words, the ST can be taken to say "the Old Masters" have portrayed (human) suffering in such a way that we are better informed about its occurrence and nature. Its domain is the individual human; its occurrence is everywhere and at all times; its reception and perception by others is minimal; its meaning is revealed to the refined Old Masters who for reasons unknown to us were preoccupied with suffering not only in Christian topics and themes but also in wider human and mythical domains.

The translation sets to assert that suffering has been attested and well-documented by the great artists. The reference to Brueghel and Acarus brings into the reader's mind the relationship between religion and mythology, and this will shift the scene in Arabic to Europe, the home of the myth being reported. Just before I turn to my last example, I would like to note the significant falling stress on two final syllables (underlined below) in the translation of Audens's statement, which, after the long repeated vowel "aa" for the "suffering", brings an important pause that enables the reader/listener to feel a sense of tranquility and give the poet time to procure the awe of pain and suffering.

> 'an l'aalaam lam ya<u>gfal,</u>
> 'uzamaa'u l<u>fan:</u> …

 Now I would like to look at a last example of a translation of a short poem by Emily Dickinson into Arabic.

> **I dwell in Possibility—**
> **A fairer House than Prose—**
> **More numerous of Windows—**
> **Superior— for Door—**
> **Of Chambers as the Cedars—**
> **Impregnable of Eye—**
> **And for an Everlasting Roof**
> **The Gambrels of the Sky—**
> **Of Visitors— the fairest—**
> **For Occupation— This—**
> **The spreading wide my narrow Hands**
> **To gather Paradise—**
> > **(Emily Dickinson, the Norton Introduction …, p. 358)**

The Arabic translation is:

أقطن في الإمكان——

I dwell in the <u>potential</u>

بيتاً أرق من النثر——

A house thinner than prose

بنوافذ أكثر من الحصر——

with unnumbered windows

تفوق الأبواب——

more than doors

بغرف كالأرز——

in rooms like cider

لتملئ العين——

filling the eye

وسقف أبدي

and a ceiling eternal

قبة زرقاء——

dome of the sky

بزوار هم الألطف——

with visitors who are more delicate

ليشغلوا——هذا——

to occupy— this

واسعاً افتح زراعي الضيقتيين

widely I open my arms

لأضم الفردوس .

To embrace paradise.
(Translated by Sameer Al-Naser)

A simple look at this translation shows that the translator's experience of Dickinson's poetry is not deep, and thus the engagement with the poem suffers from distance treatment. One can make a number of points about the translation. First, the use of "al'imkaan" (potential) as a translation of "possibility", brings to the mind open non-realized power. The two notions are related, but "al'imkaan" in Arabic is primarily abstract. "Possibility"

takes us to all possible worlds, infinity, and thus it is nearer to the creative domain of poetry. The reference to "Prose" is thus not developed much in the translation, which results in a contrast between the vivid dwelling of the poet and the dim world of prose. The rest of the translated poem is about a place of residence, rather than a world of spirituality and creative art. The second line in the Translated Text (TT) (house more delicate than prose) takes "fairer" to mean "delicate" where beauty and aesthetic value are at stake. This is of course in line with the translator's de-emphasis of the differences between poetry and prose. Still, in spite of this narrow gambit of the vision portrayed in the TT, the music and choice of lexical items charm the reader/listener to carry on reading to the last word. After all, the translator is in full command of the poetics of Arabic.

To gain insight into the translator's experience and background knowledge that come to play in the assertions s/he makes, I gave Dickinson's poem to a university professor who teaches twentieth century English literature, to translate into Arabic. His translation gives the critic's perspective:

<div dir="rtl">

أنا قاطن " ريوع المحتمل "

</div>

I who dwells in the happy land of probability

<div dir="rtl">

أرحب من عوالم النثر

</div>

vaster than the worlds of prose

<div dir="rtl">

وأكثر تعدداً من كل النوافذ

</div>

and more numerous of all windows

<div dir="rtl">

وأكثر سمواً منك كل المخادع

</div>

and more superior to all chambers

<div dir="rtl">

أبواب حصينة تسد المنافذ

</div>

fortified doors blocking gaps

<div dir="rtl">

تصد أعين كل مسترق للنظر

</div>

rebutting the eyes of every peeping person

<div dir="rtl">

ذروة أبدية

</div>

an eternal summit

<div dir="rtl">

حدودها كبد السماء

its boundaries is the sky canopy

أجمل الزوار بطلعتها البهية

most beautiful visitors in its lovely appearance

وكموطن يطيب لي ، هذي المرابع

and as a dwelling liked by me, these landscapes

أمد يدي إليها ، جنات عدن

I stretch my hand to them.

أطوقها ملياً

</div>

I embrace them fully.
(translated by Dr. Muhamed N. Al-Nuami)

Three points can be made about this translation. First, it is clear that it is less "literal" than the first one, and it has captured the poet's dwelling as a "happy world". This comes as contrary to our intuitive expectation, since we may anticipate a stricter "parallel" translation from a teacher of literature. Second, this translation contains more additions and more words than the first, providing a celestial description of Dickinson's choice as a "dwelling". Third, the translator's experience with Dickinson's poetry enables him to enter her world and expose its glory. The poetic choice of a dwelling by the poet is not sustained all through the translation. The "visitors" in the ST are taken as literal visitors, and not admirers and dwellers of the Poetic "Paradise". In addition, the musicality and definiteness of the first translation are not found here.

A brief comment about my own reading of Dickinson's poetry is apt here. My reading of the poem may be biased. The word "Prose" opens the text in the sense that the poet is trying to stay in the world of creative poetics as different from the dim world of "Prose". This reading is not brought forward in the above translations. But, a translation is no more than an attempt to open up the ST. This attempt is captive of the translator's interpretation which results from his/her engagement with language and life itself. Within the individual's paradigm, any embodiment of experience, any linguistic realization, is definitive. The translator's creation carries his/her views to the world and simultaneously opens up the ST to a new audience.

Superior translations seem to allow a greater scope for interpreting the translation itself.

5. Concluding Remarks:

The present paper suggests that within the American research, scholars have tackled some issues needed for the present Interpretive Frame. The frame itself has been developed to explain the nature of interpretation from a hermeneutic linguistic perspective. The discussion involves two levels. The first specifies the functional elements of the Interpretive Frame that are resorted to in the interpretation process. The second plots the interpretive act on a linguistic continuum stretching from linguistic necessity (definiteness) to linguistic infinity (creativity). Hence, the IF and the linguistic embodiment of the interpretive act are operational within the individual domain of the interpreter/translator. I shall conclude this discussion with the following brief remarks.

1. **The elements of the IF investigated here, experience and assertion, show the high level of complexity involved in the interpretive act.**

2. **The standing debate about the nature of naming by Frege, Russell, Kripke and Rosenberg gives important insights about the scope of philosophical reference. The running debate in linguistics about creativity (Chomsky 1957) meaning potential (Halliday 1978) widens the perspective of linguistic interpretation to incorporate infinite potential as well as definite reference.**

3. **The interpreter sees in the texts meanings and messages specific to him/her, though the writer/speaker may have meant something utterly different.**

4. **The interpretive potential spreads from necessity to infinity, and any interpretation captures one point, one reading, of a given text.**

5. **The translator is both interpreter and writer. His/her interpretive product enriches the hermeneutic potential of the Source Text. But his/her Translated Text is a definitive**

realization, and thus like any other text, is open to interpretation.

6. Theories of translation must incorporate, and thus explain, difference in translation, and not ignore it in pursuit of formalist reductionist dogma such as equivalence, or in an attempt to produce hasty cheap machine engineered translations.

The linguistic hermeneutic act of interpreting/translating is a charming one. It fuses language, knowledge and human experience in a creative world where cultures propagate and evolve into a translation-specific language and a translation-specific culture. The interpreter/translator dwells in the twilight of creativity where language meets experience to foster uniquely human meanings. Like every human enterprise, translation widens the cycle of our experience, but fails to close it, leaving us looking for our place in the horizon.

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APPENDIX

Below are two full Arabic translations of E. Dickinson's "I dwell in Possibilities" by Mr. Sameer Al-Naser and by Dr. Muhamed N. Al-Nuemi, in Arabic script.

1

<div dir="rtl">

أقطن في الإمكان——

بيتاً أرق من النثر——

بنوافذ أكثر من الحصر——

تفوق الأبواب——

بغرف كالأرز——

تملؤ العين——

وسقف أبدي

</div>

قبة زرقاء——

بزوار هم الألطف——

ليشغلوا——هذا——

واسعاً افتح زراعي الضيقتيين

لأضم الفردوس .

(ترجمة سمير الناصر)

2

أنا قاطن " ربوع المحتمل "

أرحب من عوالم النثر

وأكثر تعدداً من كل النوافذ

وأكثر سمواً من كل أبواب المخادع

أبواب حصينة تسد المنافذ

تصد أعين كل مسترق للنظر

ذروة أبدية

حدودها كبد السماء

أجمل الزوار بطلعتها البهية

وكموطن يطيب لي ، هذي المرابع

أمد يدي إليها ، جنات عدن

أطوقها مليا .

(ترجمة د . محمد نور النعيمي)

ضرورة الضرورة اللغوية لنظرية الترجمة

عمر شيخ الشباب

قسم اللغات الأجنبية ، جامعة الملك فيصل
الأحساء – المملكة العربية السعودية

يمكن للنقاش الدائر في فلسفة اللغة حول موضوع التسمية والضرورة (كريبكيه 1972 ، وروزنبيرغ 1994) أن يستخدم كأساس لنظرية تأويلية للترجمة . ويفترض الإطار التأويلي المقترح في هذا البحث أن منظور التأويل يمتد من الضرورة إلى اللانهاية . ويقوم البحث بتفسير الضرورة اللغوية عن طريق دراسة العلاقة بين اللغة والواقع وبين اللغة والمعرفة ، وهكذا تعطي الإطار التأويلي دعامة تثبتة .

وتبين لغة الترجمة التي يفترضها الإطار التأويلي أنها لغة وسيطة ((interlanguage)) على تعامل دائم مع الضرورة واللانهاية عبر عملية تقارب يتم فيها طرح تأكيد محدد من أجل الوصول إلى استقرار نسبي تفرضه عملية التواصل . ويعتمد البحث موقف ديفيدسون حول الـ((تأكيد)) للوصول إلى الاستقرار اللازم للإطار التأويلي ويَستخدم المنهج التأويلي الحالي مساهمات من علم اللغويات وفلسفة اللغة ليقدم ركائز لنظرية لغوية تأويلية للترجمة .